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Note
Counteracting Theft and Fraud:
The Applicability of RICO
to Organized Retail Crime
Ryan Stai*
For thirty years, Donnie Ellis terrorized financial institu-
tions in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area.' During
the 1990s, Ellis ran his own criminal ring of over thirty mem-
bers.2 His group stole automobiles, broke into homes, forged
checks, and used stolen credit cards. 3 According to law en-
forcement officials, Ellis's ring earned an astounding $500,000
per year from its fraud and forgery activity, and caused another
$250,000 in burglary damage to homes and vehicles.4 Police es-
timated that the ring grossed $5 million in profits from 1993 to
2004 while victimizing thousands of people and businesses.5 In
the fall of 2003, the group was responsible for over sixty per-
cent of the car thefts in the city of St. Paul.6
"Ellis [was] the kingpin," said one of the law enforcement
investigators responsible for Ellis's arrest in February 2004 af-
ter months of surveillance.7 "[His group has] been here for 10 to
* J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1999,
University of Minnesota. I dedicate this article to my wife, Carrie Lucking, for
her critique, recommendations, and overall support throughout this article's
creation. I am indebted to Professors Kevin Washburn and Jeff Grell for their
guidance and advice, Jeff DeBruin and Scott Carlson for their commitment
and assistance, and the Editors of the Minnesota Law Review.
1. Jim Adams, Alleged Theft Kingpin Caught, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Feb. 27, 2004, at Al, available at http://www.startribune.com/stories/
462/4632597.html.
2. Id.
3. Mara H. Gottfried, Alleged Leader of ID-Theft Ring Is Arrested,
PIONEER PRESS (St. Paul), Feb. 27, 2004, at 1A, available at http://www.
twincities.com/mld/twincities/news/8052300.htm.
4. Adams, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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15 years." Ellis oversaw a theft and fraud ring in which each
member played an "independent role."9 The ring first obtained
stolen credit cards, checking accounts, and driver's licenses to
create false identities. 10 "Middle management," composed of in-
dividuals working directly under Ellis, recruited people, often
prostitutes, to make fraudulent purchases at retail establish-
ments." Different people returned the merchandise for a full
cash refund.'2
Ellis "always tried to keep two to three layers between him
and the point of the crime" 13 and rarely engaged in criminal
acts. 4 He used several cellular telephones under different peo-
ple's identities to coordinate the activity. 5 The group quickly
used the checks and credit cards it obtained, making it more
difficult for law enforcement to catch the members.'6 Ellis was
"always in control via cell phone a few blocks away, never in
the action where he could get arrested."' While several de-
partments acting alone failed to get Ellis, it took the effort of a
multijurisdictional task force to finally apprehend him. 8 Ac-
cording to law enforcement officials, his arrest will "greatly im-
pact [St. Paul's property crime] numbers."' 9 Removing Ellis as
the ring's leader "will have a sizable impact" on fraud losses."
In many ways, Ellis's ring is reminiscent of traditional or-
ganized crime groups, complete with a kingpin, middlemen,
and runners. While it appears that Ellis's group has finally
8. Id.
9. Gottfried, supra note 3.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (quoting a law enforcement investigator).
14. Adams, supra note 1.
15. Gottfried, supra note 3.
16. Adams, supra note 1.
17. Id. (quoting a law enforcement investigator).
18. See id. Ellis's broad activity and evasiveness prevented any single po-
lice department from apprehending him. See id. The involvement of the
multijurisdictional Minnesota Financial Crimes Task Force supplied the nec-
essary investigative resources to capture Ellis. Id. The apprehension finally
occurred after an informant tipped off police that Ellis's drug addiction re-
quired him to actually start passing forged checks. Id. Within hours, investi-
gators arrested Ellis. Id. "He went out and tried to cash stolen checks himself,"
said an investigator. Id. This activity deviated from Ellis's normal hands-off
approach toward fraudulent acts. See id; see also infra note 47 (discussing the
Minnesota Financial Crimes Task Force).
19. Gottfried, supra note 3.
20. Adams, supra note 1 (quoting a law enforcement investigator).
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been eviscerated, the question arises as to whether an approach
under the federal racketeering statutes could have eliminated
the ring well before it amassed $5 million in profits. Just as the
federal criminal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO) 21 was successfully implemented against the
mob,22 perhaps it can also be used against major theft and
fraud rings. In general terms, RICO requires a pattern of rack-
eteering activity-which is defined as committing two or more
predicate criminal acts from a list of over seventy-five statuto-
rily defined crimes--conducted by either a legal entity or an in-
formal "association in fact" that affects interstate commerce.23
Ellis's ring operated for over ten years, continually engaging in
acts of forgery, identity theft, and burglary. Ellis undoubtedly
led the ring.24 The activity affected interstate commerce
through the thousands of impacted victims and fraudulent
transactions that occurred between Minnesota and Wisconsin.
This Note addresses the applicability of the federal crimi-
nal RICO statute to organized retail criminals. Part I explains
the economic impact and structure of organized retail crime
rings. Part II discusses the individual elements necessary un-
der RICO and analyzes RICO's potential applicability to organ-
ized retail crime rings. Part III analyzes the practicality of us-
ing RICO to prosecute organized retail crime rings. This Note
concludes that RICO can be an effective means of decreasing
economic losses through the prosecution of organized retail
crime rings.
I. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT AND STRUCTURE
OF ORGANIZED RETAIL CRIME RINGS
Retail crime is estimated to create annual economic losses
in excess of $80 billion. 5 While the exact economic loss caused
by organized retail crime rings is unknown,26 one expert places
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000).
22. See infra Part II.A (discussing the history of RICO and its use to coun-
teract mob activity).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
24. See Adams, supra note 1 (discussing Ellis's "kingpin" role in organiz-
ing and overseeing the individual acts of fraud and theft).
25. See infra notes 31, 37, 44 and accompanying text.
26. NAT'L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR., ORGANIZED CRIME 3 (Sept. 2002),
available at http://www.nw3c.org/downloads/OrganizedCrime.pdf (concluding
that "[a]ssessing the nature and extent of harm caused by organized crime is
difficult because of its multifaceted nature").
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the annual loss attributable solely to these rings at $30 bil-
lion.27 For purposes of this Note, retail crime will be separated
into two categories: retail financial fraud28 and retail theft.29
A. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF FINANCIAL FRAUD AND RETAIL
THEFT
Check fraud, including check counterfeiting, is one preva-
lent type of financial fraud. It represents rapidly increasing
problems damaging the nation's financial system. Overall,
losses from check fraud exceed $20 billion each year 3 1 and are
expected to increase at a rate of 2.5% each year.32 Check fraud
is ranked second highest when top American companies are
asked about crimes affecting their businesses.33
Credit card fraud is another prevalent type of financial
fraud. The Federal Trade Commission includes credit card
27. Interview with Chris Nelson, Dir. of Investigations, Target Corp., in
Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Nelson]. Target Corporation is
the parent company of retailers Target Stores, Mervyn's California, and Mar-
shall Field's Department Stores. Id. Nelson has eight years of experience in
retail investigations of organized theft and fraud rings with Target. Id. Prior
to his career in retail investigations, Nelson received law enforcement training
as a military police officer with the United States Army. Id.
28. Retail financial fraud exists in two dominant forms: check fraud and
credit fraud. Check fraud includes passing stolen, altered, or counterfeit
checks, paperhanging (purposely passing checks on closed accounts), and
check kiting (withdrawing funds from a checking account after a check has
been written but prior to the check arriving at the bank). See Nat'l Check
Fraud Ctr., Check Fraud Prevention, at http://www.ckfraud.org/ckfraud.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2004). Credit fraud includes stolen credit cards, account
takeovers, counterfeit cards, and the opening of unauthorized accounts using a
victim's personal identification. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, IDENTITY THEFT
SURVEY REPORT 4 n. 1 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/
synovatereport.pdf. Many of these fraudulent activities fall under the more
general act of identity theft. See What Is Identity Theft?, at http://www.
whitecollarcrimefyi.com/identitytheft.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
29. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
30. See Walter N. Hansen, Combating Check Fraud, 68 FBI L.
ENFORCEMENT BULL. 10 (May 1999) (stating that "check fraud represents the
most important crime problem affecting our nation's financial community");
NAT'L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR., CHECK FRAuD 2 (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.nw3c.org/downloads/CheckFraud.pdf (discussing the fact that ad-
vances in computer and printing technology have made check forgery an eas-
ier crime to commit).
31. Greg Litster, Check Fraud Security and System Defenses, PAYTECH,
Nov. 2002, at 29, available at http://www.americanpayroll.org/pdfs/pt2k/
k1102.pdf.
32. NAT'L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR., supra note 30, at 2.
33. Litster, supra note 31, at 29.
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fraud as a form of identity theft, and further categorizes credit
card fraud into subcategories, depending on the method utilized
to complete the act of fraud.34 Annually, more than three mil-
lion Americans are victims of crimes in which a fraudulent
credit account is opened in their name, resulting in a nation-
wide financial loss of $32.9 billion.35 Crimes in which a victim's
existing credit account is misappropriated annually affect more
than six million Americans and produce a financial loss of $14
billion. 6 The overall annual loss to identity theft is $47.6 bil-
lion.37 In the past five years, approximately twenty-seven mil-
lion Americans have been victims of identity theft.3
Retail theft falls into two categories-petty shoplifting39
and organized retail theft.4 ° Organized retail theft represents a
more detailed and complex criminal scheme than simple shop-
lifting. 4' Retailers annually lose $31.8 billion due to shoplift-
34. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 28, at 4 n.1. The FTC divides credit
card fraud into such categories as "New Accounts & Other Frauds," "Misuse of
Existing Credit Card or Card Numbers," and "Misuse of Existing Non-Credit
Card Accounts or Account Number." Id. The crime of identity theft is commit-
ted when "an individual appropriates another's name, address, social security
number, or other identifying information to commit fraud." Erin M. Shoudt,
Comment, Identity Theft Victims "Cry Out" for Reform, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 339,
341 (2002) (quoting The Identify Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act: Hear-
ing on S.J. Res. 512 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Tech., Terrorism, and Gov't Info., 105th Cong. 17 (1998) (statement of David
Medine, Assoc. Dir. of Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Prot., Fed. Trade
Comm'n)).
35. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 28, at 7. This category, referred to as
"New Accounts & Other Frauds," is defined as misusing a victim's personal
information to "open new credit accounts, take out new loans, or engage in
other types of fraud, such as misuse of the victim's name and identifying in-
formation when someone is charged with a crime, when renting an apartment,
or when obtaining medical care." Id. at 4.
36. Id. at 7. "Misuse of Existing Accounts" consists of "the misuse of one or
more existing credit cards or credit card account numbers" and the "misuse of
one or more of [a victim's] existing accounts other than credit cards-for ex-
ample checking or savings accounts or telephone accounts." Id. at 4.
37. Id. at 7.
38. Id. at 12.
39. CHARLES I. MILLER, FOOD MKTG. INST., A REPORT ON ORGANIZED
RETAIL THEFT 3 (2003), available at http://www.fmi.org/loss/ORT/ORT-report.
pdf. Petty shoplifting is "the lower tier ... in the misdemeanor category." Id. It
can be best thought of as a crime of opportunity. Petty theft is not considered
in this Note.
40. Id. at 4. Professional or organized retail theft is committed by people
that use shoplifting as a means of living. See id.
41. See Nelson, supra note 27. Organized theft is a "preconceived criminal
idea or enterprise with the express concern of taking large quantities of com-
modity product." Id.
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ing,42 and organized retail theft represents "the most pressing
security problem confronting retailers."43 Theft losses from or-
ganized groups are estimated to be as high as $15 billion per
44year.
B. THE ORGANIZATION OF RETAIL CRIME RINGS
While figures do not exist to quantify the number or eco-
45
nomic impact of organized retail crime rings in operation, one
retail investigations expert conservatively estimates the num-
ber to be more than five hundred.46 From a financial stand-
point, organized financial fraud rings may be responsible for
more than half of all financial fraud.47
Though slightly larger in the number of associated mem-
bers, Donnie Ellis's group typifies the general structure of a fi-nancil frud " 48
nancial fraud ring. Rings generally consist of eight to twelve
42. Richard C. Hollinger & Jason L. Davis, 2002 National Retail Security
Survey Final Report, UNIV. OF FLA. SEC. RES. PROJECT 4 (2003), available at
http://web.soc.ufl.edu/SRP/finalreport-2002.pdf.
43. MILLER, supra note 39, at 1.
44. Id.; cf. King Rogers, Organized Retail Theft: From Prison Training
Grounds to a Store Near You, LOSSPREVENTION, Fall 2001, at 18, 22 (citing an
industry expert that estimated the loss to be $12 billion annually).
45. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
46. See Nelson, supra note 27. Nelson estimates that hundreds of these
rings operate on a national or multistate level. Id. From January 2003 to Oc-
tober 2003, Target Corporation investigators had a role in the arrests of more
than five hundred individuals stemming from over three hundred cases. Id.
During that time, Target Corporation investigators managed more than five
hundred active investigations on organized retail crime rings. Id.
47. E-mail from John McCullough, Director, Retailers Protection Associa-
tion, to Ryan Stai (Oct. 1, 2003) [hereinafter McCullough] (on file with author).
McCullough spent twenty-two years in the retail loss prevention industry. Id.
He is a Certified Protection Professional and Certified Fraud Examiner. Id.
For the past five years, he has directed the Retailers Protection Association, a
group of 270 retail and banking members and 750 participating law enforce-
ment members. Id.
While McCullough has not seen empirical data on actual figures, his in-
vestigative experience regarding financial fraud suggests that the economic
impact of organized fraud rings "could be as much as seventy to eighty percent
of all consumer financial fraud crime dollars (account takeovers and identity
theft crimes)." Id. He believes that as a result of joint efforts by his group and
the Minnesota Financial Crimes Task Force, "taking out one to two major
crime groups will reduce fraud rates by fifty percent" in a specific area. Id. The
Minnesota Financial Crimes Task Force investigates "well-organized criminal
groups" that commit acts of financial fraud. Chris Graves & Dan Browning,
Joining Forces to Build Cases, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Feb. 10, 2002, at
A14, available at http://www.startribune.com/stories/1665/1606595.html.
48. See supra notes 1-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ellis's
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group members.49 Often, the leader of the ring organizes the
members and coordinates their fraudulent activity, producing
and dispersing counterfeit checks to "runners," distributing the
profits from fraudulent activity, and recruiting individuals to
pass counterfeit and stolen checks.5° Generally, members below
the leader conduct the fraudulent activity, in a role similar to
"mules" in the drug trafficking world.51
A theft ring serves as an "organized criminal enterprise"52
consisting of members who frequently are "former convicted
felons who learned of this new way to make a substantial tax-
free cash income during conversations with other inmates."53
Generally, a "booster"5 4 steals specifically requested merchan-
group.
49. See McCullough, supra note 47.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 323 F.3d 1314, 1316 (11th Cir.
2003) (discussing a counterfeit check ring with two primary leaders responsi-
ble for the printing and distribution of counterfeit checks, three middlemen in
charge of recruitment and serving as drivers, and approximately nineteen
"runners" that passed the counterfeits); United States v. Taylor, No. 98-3514,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 30656, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 1999) (involving a coun-
terfeit check-cashing ring led by two individuals that recruited and instructed
"cashers" to pass the counterfeit checks, paying the cashers twenty-five per-
cent of the proceeds); United States v. Bigger, No. 97-2005, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2042, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 9, 1998) (describing a nationwide counterfeit
check ring operated from California with numerous regional "organized cells"
for the purposes of printing, distributing, and passing counterfeit checks). But
see, e.g., Kelly Scott, Police Arrest 8 in Forged Check Ring, ST. CLOUD TIMES
(Minn.), Nov. 14, 2003, at 1A (discussing the arrest of eight individuals for
passing over $35,000 in counterfeit payroll checks, limited solely to five coun-
ties in central Minnesota). Individuals that pass counterfeit and stolen checks
are referred to as "runners." See Hunter, 323 F.3d at 1316.
51. See McCullough, supra note 47. These individuals "are nothing more
than 'pawns or tools'. . . . In the fraud business [they] are also call[ed] mules."
Id.
52. MILLER, supra note 39, at 4. Organized retail theft rings generally
consist of three levels. Id. The lowest level consists of thieves that support
themselves by stealing and selling the stolen merchandise to a fence. Id. The
middle level consists of groups of professional shoplifters that are "recruited,
trained and supervised by street fences." Id. It is not uncommon for these
"boosters" to have annual incomes of $100,000 stemming from their theft ac-
tivities. Id. The final level consists of operations that repackage stolen items
purchased from fences and illegitimate wholesalers who sell the repackaged
merchandise to legitimate retailers. Id. at 5; see also Rogers, supra note 44, at
20-21.
53. Rogers, supra note 44, at 20.
54. A "booster" is the industry term for "someone who steals for a living
and who is involved in an organized criminal enterprise." Id.; see also supra
note 52.
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dise55 and sells it to a "fence." 6 The fence then sells the mer-
chandise either to legitimate consumers or to an illegitimate
repackaging entity.57 Illegitimate repackaging entities "clean up
stolen product," repackage it, and sell it either to legitimate
retailers or to wholesalers who mix the stolen merchandise
with legitimate products.5 The entire scheme results in sub-
stantial profits for everyone involved.59 It is not uncommon for
organized retail theft rings to employ more than fifty mem-
berslegardless of the type of ring, someone sits at the top of
the hierarchy and oversees the entire organization.6 ' The more
profitable and structurally complex rings take measures to in-
sulate the leadership of the ring from the runners of the
group. 62 Identifying, catching, and prosecuting the high-ranking
members of the ring is extremely difficult." Removing the hier-
archical leadership generally results in dissipation of the ring,
most often through prosecution of all of its identifiable mem-
bers.64 As one retail investigations expert commented, "if you do
55. See MILLER, supra note 39, at 16-17 (reproducing a list supplied to a
booster containing specific merchandise the booster was requested to steal).
56. Rogers, supra note 44, at 20. A "fence" is someone who buys merchan-
dise from professional shoplifters for a fraction of its retail value and generally
recruits and trains boosters.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 20-21. "Cleaning up" is the process of removing price tags and
security devices from stolen product. Id. It may also involve changing expira-
tion dates on perishable items. Id.
59. Id. at 20. One booster admitted to a cash income of $120,000 to
$150,000 per year. Id.
60. Nelson, supra note 27. Target Corporation routinely investigates
groups composed of forty to fifty members. Id.
61. Id. ("As a general rule, on each side, you have somebody that's up top,
pulling the strings and orchestrating.").
62. Id. (noting that the good groups are similar to terrorist cells in that
they "take steps to isolate" the different subparts of the ring).
63. Hansen, supra note 30, at 12 (stating that "[it remains extremely dif-
ficult to identify, let alone convict, the [check] passer's associates, such as the
thief or counterfeiter and those involved in distributing the checks"); Paul E.
Coffey, The Selection, Analysis, and Approval of Federal RICO Prosecutions,
65 NOTRE DAME L. REV 1035, 1038 (1990) (noting that the leaders of crime
families are "difficult to convict due to their insulation from crimes committed
by their underlings"); Nelson, supra note 27 (commenting that it is difficult to
catch the leader of a ring and that identifying and apprehending this person
takes up the "lion's share of investigative time").
64. See MILLER, supra note 39, at 5-11 (describing several successful
investigations and prosecutions of organized theft rings); see also Press
Release, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Effectiveness of the Government's
Attack on La Cosa Nostra 12 (Apr. 11, 1988), available at http://161.203.16.4/
d39t12/135549.pdf [hereinafter Attack on La Cosa Nostra] (conveying that
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not stop them, they will continue. They will do multiple crimi-
nal acts and they'll continue to do it as a process until they are
stopped or caught."
65
Financial fraud rings and theft rings are formed through
similar means.66 A ring is formed either from associations
within a prior criminal syndicate 7 or when an individual envi-
sions a lucrative criminal endeavor and recruits members to
assist.68 Originators of the ring are often highly selective of the
individuals they bring into the organization.69 Violence may be
used either to enforce group loyalty or to punish individuals for
conduct harmful to the continued existence and profitability of
the organized crime ring.7° Once formed, the rings are often run
with a criminal mindset similar to a gang or, in some cases, a
legal business.71
While many financial fraud and theft rings conduct their
activity in local metropolitan areas,72 several rings operate on a
membership losses to La Cosa Nostra due to the government's continuous in-
vestigation and prosecution left vacancies in the leadership and resulted in
operational difficulty).
65. Nelson, supra note 27. Nelson also stated that the important fact
about organized rings "is that they have devised a criminal scheme that is
perpetrated over and over again in order to make money. The way that they
make money is the fact that they do it over and over again." Id.; see also
United States v. Gonzalez, 491 F.2d 1202, 1206 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting that
organized criminal rings "do not normally conceive of the association as engag-
ing in one unlawful transaction and then disbanding," but that "the nature of
such organizations seems to be an ongoing operation").
66. See Nelson, supra note 27 (stating that other than the method of
criminal activity, financial fraud and theft rings are generally formulated and
structured in similar fashion).
67. See Rogers, supra note 44, at 20 (commenting on the number of felons
that engage in organized retail crime).
68. See Nelson, supra note 27 (stating that while the initiative behind
some rings originates in prison, others are formed by individuals "that get
good ideas").
69. Id. (commenting that some rings have a "very clear cut selection proc-
ess").
70. Id. (admitting that some groups have an enforcement wing that pun-
ishes individuals that have spoken to law enforcement agencies); see also
Rogers, supra note 44, at 20 (identifying a former booster that feared for his
life due to his cooperation with law enforcement officials).
71. See Nelson, supra note 27 (adding that ring members can be equated
with "business people . .. on the wrong side of the law").
72. See McCullough, supra note 47 (stating that most of the organized fi-
nancial fraud groups in Minnesota operate solely within the Minneapolis-St.
Paul area); Nelson, supra note 27 (stating that "numerically, it's probably
more common that [organized retail crime is] done in a metro area").
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multistate or national level.73 Highly profitable rings are often
mobile groups that travel on a multistate or national level.74
Groups are mobile for many reasons. First, because several of
the crimes committed by organized retail rings are predicated
on the group remaining anonymous, members of the group do
not want to be recognized.75 Second, rings are conscious of
criminal laws and move around to prevent "rais[ing] up the
level of the crime" in any one jurisdiction."6 Rings recognize
that mobility "provides them better cover and ... a bigger
venue to victimize."77 The difficulty in efficiently prosecuting
multistate activity works to assist their broad-scale endeav-
78
ors.
Finally, it is common for rings engaged in retail crime to
partake in other illegal acts, such as narcotics trafficking,
weapons, and prostitution.9 Car theft and burglary have also
been associated with retail crime rings.8° The ring leaders and
73. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Five Women Arrested on Fi-
nancial Fraud Charges Allegedly Scammed $600,000 in Merchandise at Retail
Stores Using False IDs (Oct. 2, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
usao/iln/pr/2002/pr1002_01.pdf (discussing a financial fraud group that trav-
eled throughout the Midwest and Florida passing counterfeit checks); supra
notes 46, 50 and accompanying text (discussing nationally based groups).
74. Nelson, supra note 27 (stating that rings that operate interstate "are
the ones that really generate a lot of the money"); see also Press Release, supra
note 73 (commenting on a traveling group that earned more than $600,000 in
four years from its activity).
75. Nelson, supra note 27 (indicating that groups "don't like to be recog-
nized").
76. Id.; see also Hansen, supra note 30, at 12 (acknowledging that forgery
suspects avoid committing too many offenses in one area).
77. Nelson, supra note 27.
78. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III
& TV, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 920, 924 (1987) (noting that multijurisdictional
criminal activity "may prevent any court from having jurisdiction over enough
of the case to permit unified prosecution of the entire operation in a manner
that makes significant penalties available" and that RICO has effectively
permitted prosecutions in these cases).
79. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., INVESTIGATIVE PROGRAMS:
PROTECTING AMERICA'S FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 4 (July 8, 2003), http://www.dhs.
gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Financial_CrimesPressKit.doc (noting that iden-
tity crimes are "almost always associated with other crimes such as narcotics
and weapons trafficking, organized crime, mail theft and fraud, money laun-
dering, immigration fraud, and terrorism"); Adams, supra note 1 (noting that
the police recovered a semiautomatic handgun and crack cocaine from Donnie
Ellis and that Ellis frequently recruited prostitutes to write fraudulent
checks).
80. Nelson, supra note 27 (describing types of criminal activity associated
with organized retail crime); see also Adams, supra note 1 (detailing Ellis's ve-
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fences pay many boosters with drugs.8' Financial fraud rings
may conduct criminal acts of general counterfeiting, pick pock-
eting, and illegal cash transactions.82 Additionally, some rings
will use members of their group to infiltrate legitimate busi-
nesses in an effort to obtain information critical to the group's
profitable crimes. 3 An increasing trend is the funneling of
theft- and fraud-related profits to fund foreign terrorists
84groups.
II. FEDERAL RACKETEER INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT
A. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF RICO
In 1970, Congress passed the federal racketeering stat-
81
utes, collectively known as the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act.86 The purpose of RICO was to "seek the
eradication of organized crime .. .by strengthening the legal
tools in the evidence-gathering process . . .and by providing
enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal" with organized
criminals. Congress specifically found that organized crime
was a "highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activ-
ity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's econ-
omy"8 8 and that "organized crime activities in the United States
weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system,... inter-
fere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and for-
eign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine
hicle theft activities).
81. Nelson, supra note 27.
82. See Hansen, supra note 30, at 11.
83. Nelson, supra note 27 (noting that, on occasion, members of the ring
will seek employment at banks, credit unions, and other financial institutions
to secure vital information such as victim identities and credit histories and as
a means of monitoring the criminal acts and potential detection of the group's
efforts).
84. Id. (commenting that in 2003, Target Corporation investigated three
significant cases where the rings' profits were sent overseas to fund foreign-
based terrorist groups); see also NAT'L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR., supra note
30, at 3 (discussing the activity of a North Carolina-based group that was
funding the Middle Eastern terrorist group Hezbollah).
85. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941
(1970).
86. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
87. 84 Stat. at 923.
88. Id. at 922.
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the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens." 9 Congress
felt RICO was necessary because "the sanctions and remedies
available to the Government [were] unnecessarily limited in
scope and impact."90
In its thirty years of existence, RICO has been the most ef-
fective governmental tool to combat organized crime.9' The dif-
ficulty in prosecuting organized crime leaders prior to RICO
rested in their insulation from the activities of the organized
group.92 Initially, attempts at prosecuting organized crime were
performed at a "piecemeal" level, only charging individual
members with single criminal acts.93 The leaders of the rings,
"when caught, were only penalized for what seemed to be un-
important crimes," and criminal prosecutions of the overall or-
ganization were inhibited. For successful prosecution of the
entire organization, the government needed to pierce this com-
plex structure, which usually proved impossible. 9'
The advent of RICO brought to the government a "powerful
weapon in this battle"96 to counter the primary purpose of or-
89. Id. at 923; see also Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Crimi-
nality: A Response to Gerard E. Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 774, 775 (1988)
(stating that in enacting RICO, Congress realized the government's prior fail-
ure in focusing on individual members rather than the criminal group as an
organized body, allowing organized crime to prosper).
90. 84 Stat. at 923.
91. See Coffey, supra note 63, at 1036; Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Current
RICO Policies of the Department of Justice, 43 VAND. L. REV. 651, 652-53
(1990); see also G. Robert Blakey & John Robert Blakey, Civil and Criminal
RICO: An Overview of the Statute and Its Operation, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 36, 42
(1997) (concluding that RICO is presently the "prosecutor's tool of choice
against sophisticated forms of crime"); Lesley Suzanne Bonney, Comment, The
Prosecution of Sophisticated Urban Street Gangs: A Proper Application of
RICO, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 579, 597 (1993) (noting that RICO has been util-
ized to "cripple, if not dismantle" most Mafia families).
92. See Coffey, supra note 63, at 1038; see also Lynch, supra note 78, at
967 (noting that the difficulty in prosecuting the leaders of organized crime
has to do with the inability to produce enough evidence to directly connect
them to the predicate crimes).
93. Attack on La Cosa Nostra, supra note 64, at 14.
94. Id.; see also Morgan Cloud, Organized Crime, RICO, and the European
Union, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 243, 255 (2000) (noting that the arrest
and conviction of a few members has very little impact on the continued suc-
cess of an organized ring).
95. Coffey, supra note 63, at 1038; see also Attack on La Cosa Nostra, su-
pra note 64, at 3-4 (noting the Mafia's strict code of behavior and its propen-
sity for violence).
96. Coffey, supra note 63, at 1038.
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ganized crime: earning money.97 RICO allowed prosecutors to
charge and present evidence against the organization as a
whole, 8 resulting in the indictment of key leaders of the organ-
ized group. 99 Subsequent successful prosecution resulted in the
removal of organized crime leadership and the forfeiture of ring
assets.' 0 As prosecutors and law enforcement gained experi-
ence, RICO became an even more effective tool.10'
RICO proved effective because it focused law enforcement
on organized crime and rewarded prosecutors by securing con-
victions of crime leaders.0 2 As a result, membership in organ-
ized criminal groups became "fearful prospects for professional
97. Attack on La Cosa Nostra, supra note 64, at 4. However, the Supreme
Court eliminated the need for an economic purpose in National Organization
for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 259 (1994).
98. Attack on La Cosa Nostra, supra note 64, at 14.
99. Richard L. Worsnop, Mafia Crackdown: Has Relentless Prosecution
Fatally Weakened the U.S. Mafia?, 2 CQ RESEARCHER 265, 268 (1992) (stating
that RICO's application allowed prosecutors to attack the leadership and
revenue of the ring and that successful prosecution of Mafia leadership cre-
ated a "devastating ripple effect" as "unseasoned successors," unqualified to
lead, stepped into the vacancies).
100. See Attack on La Cosa Nostra, supra note 64, at 14.
101. Worsnop, supra note 99, at 269. "In the 1960s, [prosecutors] figured
out who the mob leaders were .... In the 1970s, [prosecutors] drafted the leg-
islation to fight organized crime. And in the 1980s, [prosecutors] found out
how to apply the legislation effectively." Id. (quoting University of Notre Dame
law professor G. Robert Blakey). According to the director of New York's Or-
ganized Crime Task Force, "[Clurrent law enforcement efforts ... in the next
five to 10 years [will render the mob] totally unrecognizable." Id. But cf. id.
(referring to another source as saying organized crime is only in a "transi-
tional phase" and may turn out stronger); John M. Nonna & Melissa P. Cor-
rado, RICO Reform: "Weeding Out" Garden Variety Disputes Under the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 825,
832 (1990) (stating that recent Congressional action to expand the number of
RICO predicate acts "acknowledges that racketeering activity and activity
commonly associated with racketeering takes many forms").
102. Coffey, supra note 63, at 1039. The advantageous effects of RICO out-
weigh the negatives of complex litigation and joinder that can result from the
application of RICO. See id. Additionally, while RICO was a key element in
the prosecution of organized crime, other measures, such as increased witness
protection, the creation of guidelines in pretrial detention, and enhanced sur-
veillance tools, contributed to the government's success. See Attack on La Cosa
Nostra, supra note 64, at 16. But cf Coffey, supra note 63, at 1045 (noting the
legitimacy of the argument that organized criminal activities can be prose-
cuted using less complicated statutes and that the use of RICO introduces the
negative potential that the trial will become too complex and filled with "for-
eign concepts of enterprise, racketeering, and pattern"); C.J. William H.
Rehnquist, Get RICO Out of My Courtroom, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1989, at A14
(expressing concern that RICO cases are flooding the federal docket).
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criminals," °3 and the power of traditional organized crime
groups greatly decreased.1
4
Additionally, the legislative history behind RICO directs
that the statute "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes." 05 This principle actively guides judicial
interpretations of RICO, because "courts are without authority
to restrict the application of the statute." 6 The Supreme Court
has noted that in creating RICO, Congress understood that the
"stereotypical" organized crime ring was expanding its activity
beyond traditional organized crimes.' 7 RICO's broad applica-
tion "encompass[es] a wide range of criminal activity, taking
many different forms and [is] likely to attract a broad array of
perpetrators operating in many different ways."' 8
RICO establishes criminal'0 9 and civil"0 actions, as well as
forfeiture of any interest a person obtains in property as a re-
sult of the RICO violation."' Criminal RICO contains four sub-
stantive offenses. First, it forbids using racketeering income
to invest in a legitimate business."' Second, it bans the use of
racketeering income to obtain control of a legitimate busi-
ness."4 Third, RICO prohibits the running of an enterprise
103. Attack on La Cosa Nostra, supra note 64, at 13.
104. See Hansen, supra note 30, at 10 (noting that the identification of "or-
ganized check fraud activity... can have a measurable impact on this perva-
sive crime problem"); Cloud, supra note 94, at 255; supra note 94 and
accompanying text.
105. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 947 (1970); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497
(1985) ("RICO is to be read broadly.").
106. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-88 (1981) (stating that
the broad interpretation attached to RICO as evidenced through its legislative
history does not restrict its application).
107. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989)
(noting that Congress's "very generous definition of 'racketeering activity,' ac-
knowledges the breakdown of the traditional conception of organized crime").
108. Id. at 248-49.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000).
110. Id. § 1964.
111. Id. §§ 1963(c), 1964(a).
112. Artie Jones et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 39
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 977, 980 (2002); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc.,
473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985) (stating that § 1962 makes it illegal for a person "to
use money derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to invest in an en-
terprise, to acquire control of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity, or to conduct an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity").
113. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
114. Id. § 1962(b).
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through racketeering activity. 115 Finally, it makes it a crime to
conspire in any of the first three substantive offenses.1 6 Be-
cause organized retail crime rarely attempts to infiltrate a le-
gitimate business, its activity is analogous to running an en-
terprise through racketeering activity.117 Thus, the remainder
of this Note focuses exclusively on the applicability of the RICO
provision that prohibits running an enterprise through racket-
eering activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
B. THE ELEMENTS OF RICO AND ITS APPLICATION TO
ORGANIZED RETAIL CRIME RINGS
RICO requires three general elements: a pattern of racket-
eering activity, the existence of an enterprise, and an effect on
interstate commerce. 118 The first two elements, however, consist
of several subelements.
1. Pattern of Racketeering Activity
The statutory definition of RICO requires a "pattern of
racketeering activity," consisting of defined predicate offenses
committed within a ten-year period."9 Supreme Court jurispru-
dence, however, renders the statutory definition virtually
meaningless. In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.," 0 the Supreme
Court noted that "while two acts are necessary, they may not
be sufficient. " 12' The Court later elaborated that a pattern in-
volves a relationship between the predicate acts and the threat
of continued activity.12  Illegal acts of a ring that "have the
same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distin-
guishing characteristics and are not isolated events" establish
the necessary relationship between the predicate acts. 22 The
Court also decided that a "series of related predicates extending
over a substantial period of time" fulfills the "continuity" re-
115. Id. § 1962(c).
116. Id. § 1962(d).
117. Few criminal charges are brought under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a) or (b).
Jones, supra note 112, at 997-98; see also Coffey, supra note 63, at 1042 (stat-
ing that "fraud cases are uncommon RICOs").
118. Jones, supra note 112, at 981.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
120. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
121. Id. at 496 n.14.
122. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
123. Id. at 240 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)).
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quirement. 1 4 While the government must independently estab-
lish the "continuity plus relationship" element, the evidefice re-
quired for each often overlaps.'
Several of RICO's predicate offenses apply in the context of
organized retail crime. For example, organized rings that com-
mit acts of theft from retail establishments in different states
violate federal laws if they transport stolen merchandise be-
tween states. 126 Rings that perpetrate cargo theft 127 violate stat-
utes prohibiting theft of interstate shipments of merchandise.128
Financial fraud rings utilizing fake identification cards violate
laws relating to fraudulent activity involving identification
documents 129 or "access devices."" ° Rings that defraud financial
institutions violate additional federal laws.1 " Organized rings
communicating by mail or wire violate laws relating to mail
132
and wire fraud."' Finally, groups dealing in valuable stolen
124. Id. at 242. The Court elaborated that "[piredicate acts extending over
a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not sat-
isfy" the continuity requirement. Id. Instead, Congress intended "long-term
criminal conduct" to be the activity targeted as prohibited. Id. The Court also
recognized that RICO actions can be brought before continuity is established if
"the threat of continuity is demonstrated." Id. (emphasis omitted).
125. Jones, supra note 112, at 984.
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2000) (forbidding the transportation in inter-
state commerce of stolen merchandise exceeding $5000); id. § 2315 (barring
the reception or possession of stolen merchandise valued beyond $5000 that
has been shipped in interstate commerce).
127. "Cargo theft" is the theft of merchandise being transported. "The typi-
cal cargo theft is backing up to a trailer full of product with another tractor...
and taking it." Nelson, supra note 27.
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 659 (prohibiting theft from any vehicle "with intent to
convert to [the thief's] own use any goods or chattels moving as or which are a
part of or which constitute an interstate or foreign shipment of freight, ex-
press, or other property"); id. § 2314; id. § 2315.
129. See id. § 1028 (prohibiting the use, transfer, and possession of fraudu-
lent identification cards appearing to be issued under the authority of either
the federal or state government and the transfer or use of another person's le-
gitimate identification card for the purpose of committing a felony crime).
130. See id. § 1029 (prohibiting the production, use, or trafficking of one or
more counterfeit "access devices," defined as any "card or ... account number"
used either alone or with another access device to obtain money or property, or
the possession of fifteen or more counterfeit access devices).
131. See id. § 1344 (barring the execution of a plan to defraud or to obtain
money under the control of a financial institution).
132. See id. § 1341 (prohibiting the use of the mail in a fraud scheme to ob-
tain money or property).
133. See id. § 1343 (prohibiting the use of wire or radio communications in
a fraud scheme to obtain money or property and imposing an enhanced sen-
tence for affecting a financial institution).
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property violate statutes involving criminally derived prop-
erty.13
Organized retail crime is not profitable unless several acts
of theft and fraud are committed. 13 5 Due to transactional price
limits and the desire to minimize attention to their activity,
fraud rings generally engage in numerous small fraudulent
purchases. 36 In doing so, these rings typically pass fraudulent
instruments--checks, credit cards, and identification docu-
ments-several times. 137 This activity frequently occurs over a
prolonged period of time, often years. 38 This type of sustained
activity is standard for fraud rings. 139 The threat of continued
activity remains until the group is completely broken apart.
140
2. The Existence of an Enterprise
RICO defines an "enterprise" as either a legal entity or
"any union or group of individuals associated in fact."'4 ' RICO's
definition includes both legitimate and illegitimate enter-
prises 142 and is "equally applicable to a criminal enterprise that
has no legitimate dimension or has yet to acquire one.
"1
The Supreme Court expressed the test for an enterprise in
United States v. Turkette.'" According to the Court, an enter-
prise has two requirements. First, there must be a common
purpose among a group of individuals.1 45 Second, there must be
134. See id. § 1957 (forbidding transactions of a participant that "know-
ingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally
derived property that is of a value greater than $10,000").
135. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
137. See Press Release, supra note 73 (commenting on a fraud ring's use of
more than one hundred fake identities and that the ring passed counterfeit
checks for hundreds of dollars of merchandise per transaction while amassing
over $600,000 in fraudulent activity over four years).
138. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 65, 91-104 and accompanying text.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2000).
142. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981). The Supreme
Court has also held that an enterprise for RICO purposes does not require a
"property interest" or "economic motive." Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 259 (1994).
143. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591.
144. Id. at 576.
145. Id. at 583 (stating that for the purposes of RICO, an enterprise exists
when a group of individuals are associated for the "common purpose of engag-
ing in a course of conduct").
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evidence of an "ongoing organization" and individuals that
function as a continuous unit.146 The Court declared that an en-
terprise is "an entity separate and apart from the pattern of ac-
tivity in which it engages."147 While "enterprise" and "pattern of
racketeering activity" remained separate elements that the
government was required to prove, the Court acknowledged
that the evidence used to establish these elements may often be
148the same.
Organized retail criminal rings exist for a common pur-
pose' 4 ' and their economic motivations are well documented.9'5
That these rings commit illegal acts as a means of profit while
a hierarchy exists to divide the proceeds evidences this common
purpose.' An additional common purpose is proven through
the ring's goal of acquiring profits."'
The hierarchical structure of retail crime rings evidences
their ongoing nature.5 3 Typically, one person acts as the group
leader in organizing the individual acts of theft or fraud for the
group.1 5 4 This includes determining which retail establishments
the individual members of the group will victimize, the specific
merchandise to target, whether to return merchandise for a
cash refund or to sell it to some other group, and, if the mer-
chandise is returned, which retail establishments to utilize for
returns.'55 The leaders of the ring act as a gateway for the col-
146. Id; see also United States v. Richardson, 167 F.3d 621, 625 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (pointing to such evidence as hierarchical organization, planned activity,
consistent pattern of conduct in committing criminal acts, social ties among
the individuals, the number of criminal offenses, the number of victims, and
the unlikelihood of the conduct ceasing); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903,
924-25 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (highlighting evidence such as conduct over a geo-
graphic area, centralized operations, hierarchical organization, the existence
of "middlemen," instructing other members on how to act, and the substitution
of leadership during the organizer's incarceration).
147. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
148. Id.
149. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
152. See United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1244 (1st Cir. 1995) (stat-
ing that a common purpose can be shown through the economic gain of a ring);
see also Thomas S. O'Neill, Functions of the RICO Enterprise Concept, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 646, 713 (1989) (indicating that common purpose can
easily be proven through the "showing that the associates wanted to make
money").
153. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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lection of stolen merchandise, coordinate acts of cargo or inter-
state shipment theft, and establish or contact enterprises to re-
package and sell the stolen goods. 56 Furthermore, the organiza-
tional heads are typically responsible for distributing the
profits of the group.'57 Finally, the leaders of financial fraud
rings generally obtain and organize necessary account and vic-
tim data and then create fraudulent instruments or pass the
information on to runners so that they may produce counterfeit
checks or credit cards. 158
The runners of the group-those who actually commit the
individual acts of fraud and theft---closely follow the orders
handed down to them by the group leader."9 If asked, these
same individuals recruit additional members of the group and
also return the profits to the leader.60 The ring leaders instruct
runners, often with the threat of violence, to avoid implicating
other members of the organization upon arrest.
61
As previously discussed, the continuing nature of organized
retail crime rings is clear.'62 In the case of organized retail
theft, evidence proving the existence of a pattern also proves
the continuing nature of the organization. 163
In addition to Turkette's evidentiary requirements of a
common purpose and a continuous unit, the majority of circuits
additionally demand that an enterprise entail a separate and
distinct structure,'64 creating a three-step analysis in defining
156. See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 50-51, 54-56 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
163. The Supreme Court affirmed this "dual use" in United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); see supra note 148 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1351 (8th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1336 (7th Cir. 1996); Chang v. Chen, 80
F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940,
944 (10th Cir. 1991); Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423,
427 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Tillett, 763 F.2d 628, 631 (4th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 1983); see also O'Neill,
supra note 152, at 708-10 (discussing the additional requirement some cir-
cuits impose).
Other circuits have taken a less restrictive approach, refusing to acknowl-
edge the separate and distinct enterprise requirement. See United States v.
Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that nothing in RICO's legisla-
tive history or language requires that the "alleged enterprise must engage in
activities separate and distinct"); see also United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d
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an enterprise. "5 This third element requires that the enterprise
be a separate and distinct group "beyond that which is neces-
sary merely to commit each of the ... predicate racketeering
offenses."'66 These circuits require more than a simple agree-
ment to commit criminal offenses.'67 Evidence that the ring is
involved in multiple predicate acts and other functions on a
continual basis, 16 or that the organizational structure stretches
beyond what is necessary to effectuate the predicate offenses,
6 9
is sufficient to satisfy the separate and distinct requirement. It
is unnecessary to show that a ring exists for a purpose com-
pletely unrelated to its racketeering activity.
7 0
A defendant must also "participate in the operation or
management of the enterprise itself."'7 In providing additional
guidance, the Supreme Court has said that "[a]n enterprise is
'operated' not just by upper management but also by lower
rung participants . . .who are under the direction of upper
343, 356-59, 362-63 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam); United States v. Qauod,
777 F.2d 1105, 1115-16 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d
915, 921 (11th Cir. 1983). As long as the evidence sufficiently satisfies both the
enterprise and pattern elements, there is no requirement that a separate and
distinct structure be present. Mazzei, 700 F.2d at 89.
165. See, e.g., Handeen, 112 F.3d at 1351; United States v. Console, 13 F.3d
641, 650 (3d Cir. 1993); Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 221. The requirement of a sepa-
rate and distinct structure is said to prevent the use of RICO from completely
eliminating the enterprise element. United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647,
664 (8th Cir. 1982) (stating that allowing an enterprise to be an informal asso-
ciation compiled solely to commit acts of racketeering would "simply pun-
ish.., the commission of two of the specified crimes within a 10-year period"
and altogether eliminate the enterprise element).
166. Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 224; see also O'Neill, supra note 152, at 711-12
(stating that evidence of a separate and distinct structure can be proven with
the existence of a decision-making hierarchy, a division of labor indicating
specialized or permanent roles, or a "sophisticated financial structure").
167. United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting
that "[i]f the 'enterprise' is just a name for the ... agreement to commit...
crimes,. . . then it would not be an enterprise within the meaning of the stat-
ute").
168. See Montesano, 818 F.2d at 427 (noting that committing several
criminal acts sufficiently satisfies the separate structure requirement).
169. See Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 996 (8th
Cir. 1989) (advising that "a diverse pattern of crimes or ... an organizational
pattern or system of authority beyond what [is] necessary to perpetrate the
predicate crimes" satisfies the separate structure element (quoting Bledsoe,
674 F.2d at 665)).
170. United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1521 (8th Cir. 1995).
171. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993) (clarifying the
statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).
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management." 72 While the Court refused to decide how far
down the "ladder" RICO liability extended,'73 federal courts
have generally extended liability to individuals that carried out
the instructions of a superior.7 4 Individuals who knowingly
execute decisions made by the leadership of the ring also par-
ticipate in the organization. 1
75
In practice, courts broadly construe the enterprise re-
quirement. 1 7 Courts have considerable discretion in determin-
ing the existence of an enterprise. 177 Prosecutions under RICO
have rested primarily on the "expansive prohibition of the op-
eration of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity ... directed at the operations of illegitimate criminal enter-
prises themselves." 7 ' RICO charges have been brought against
criminals whose racketeering activity consists of a "series of
crimes having looser connections than have traditionally been
permitted even in conspiracy prosecutions." 79 The Supreme
Court has acknowledged that, in accordance with RICO's legis-
lative history, the enterprise requirement is to be broadly con-
strued.8 0
The most difficult part of the enterprise analysis as it re-
lates to organized retail crime rings is determining whether a
separate and distinct structure exists.18 ' Organized retail crime
172. Id. at 184.
173. Id. at 184 n.9.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 750 (1st Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that "one may 'take part in' the conduct of an enterprise by knowingly im-
plementing decisions").
175. MCM Partners, Inc. v. Andrews-Bartlett & Assoc., Inc., 62 F.3d 967,
979 (7th Cir. 1995).
176. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 662 (1987). Courts have found enterprises in diverse
entities, such as a motorcycle club, United States v. Starrett, 55 F.3d 1525,
1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), a tavern, United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d
1159, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 1980), a beauty college, United States v. Weather-
spoon, 581 F.2d 595, 597-98 (7th Cir. 1978), a criminal gang, United States v.
Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1337 (7th Cir. 1996), and a religious cult, United States
v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
177. Jones, supra note 112, at 988.
178. Lynch, supra note 176, at 662.
179. Id.
180. See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (stating
that the "fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly antici-
pated by Congress . . . demonstrates breadth" (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. Am.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984))).
181. The only difference between the tests employed by the circuits in-
volves the requirement of a separate and distinct enterprise. Therefore, a find-
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rings frequently exist for purposes other than committing or-
ganized retail fraud. 182 These groups often traffic in illegal nar-
cotics, either for consumption by the group or to profit from the
sale of these drugs.'18 Some of these groups also sell the mer-
chandise they obtain to individuals associated with fences and
organized retail theft. 84 Lastly, these groups serve as social
units, often composed of individuals who have known each
other for several years, extending beyond their fraudulent ac-
tivity.
6 5
Theft and fraud activities of organized rings often extend
beyond the requisite acts of the predicate offense. For example,
theft of merchandise from either a retail establishment (a state,
not federal, crime) or an interstate shipment of goods (a federal
offense) does not require an organizational aspect that involves
middlemen, repackaging, and distribution.' 8 Moreover, finan-
cial fraud rings that acquire counterfeit identification (a federal
crime) also engage in an enterprise unit involving a complex
scheme of creating and passing counterfeit checks before either
returning the merchandise to retail stores or selling it to fences
to earn profits.
8 7
However, not all organized rings exhibit these characteris-
tics. Certainly groups exist that do not operate on a multistate
level, instead concentrating their activity solely within one
state or metropolitan area. Some rings utilize only stolen
blank checks or credit accounts without relying on counterfeit
identification, thereby removing their activity from the federal
RICO predicate offenses. 89 Some theft rings may steal mer-
chandise only for their own personal consumption, removing
ing of an enterprise under the majority approach will automatically pass the
less-restrictive minority test. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 146 (discussing the social ties between members of or-
ganized rings).
186. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 1; Press Release, supra note 73 (detailing
the complex scheme involved in each ring's criminal activity).
188. See Scott, supra note 50, for an example of a local group confining its
activity to one specific area and arguably not committing any predicate RICO
acts.
189. Stealing someone's existing checkbook and passing stolen checks by
using the victim's altered identification would be an example of non-
counterfeiting activity that arguably does not fall within RICO's predicate of-
fenses.
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the enterprise element from the structured group. Smaller
groups may not exhibit the same structured leadership and in-
stead rely heavily on the decisions of individual ring members
to commit the predicate crimes. 90 This latter distinction is criti-
cal because it may remove smaller, less-organized retail crime
rings from the purview of RICO or make prosecution based
solely on the predicate offenses effective enough to eliminate
their existence.
3. Effect on Interstate Commerce
Finally, RICO requires an effect on interstate commerce.191
The predicate offenses, however, need only have a minimal im-
pact on commerce,'92 shown by "proof of a probable or potential
impact" on interstate commerce. 93 Other courts have held that
only the enterprise's overall conduct needs to affect interstate
commerce.' An enterprise's activities "may affect interstate
commerce by impacting the victim," 19' and the purchase of or
trafficking in goods that originate in interstate commerce gen-
erally satisfies this prong. 9 In either case, the required impact
on interstate commerce remains minimal and relatively easy to
prove.
Organized retail crime groups affect interstate commerce
in several ways. First, their criminal acts often reach a regional
or national level.'97 Further, they target nationally based retail
establishments.'9 Groups engaging in acts of identity theft vic-
timize individuals, financial institutions, and businesses
190. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 50 (reporting fraudulent activity by eight
individuals that arguably did not exhibit any hierarchal structure).
191. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000).
192. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 674 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding that "the government need only prove that the individual subject
transaction has a de minimis effect on interstate commerce").
193. United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir. 1997)
(quoting United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996)).
194. See, e.g., United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 892 (9th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam) (noting that only the overall activity of the enterprise needs to
impact interstate commerce, not each predicate act).
195. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d at 1349.
196. See, e.g., United States v. Feliciano, 223 F.3d 102, 118 (2d Cir. 2000)
(stating that the trafficking of drugs has a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce); United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 547 (5th Cir. 1979) (hold-
ing that the purchase of dynamite originating in interstate commerce satisfies
the requirements of RICO).
197. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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throughout the country. 9 Finally, they often transport their il-
legally obtained merchandise across state lines, repackage the
merchandise in states different than from where it was stolen,
200
and ultimately distribute that product to numerous states.
The overall mobility of these groups alone is enough to evidence
a drastic impact on interstate commerce. Even rings that oper-
ate solely within one state arguably impact interstate com-
merce enough to satisfy the minimal standard required by the
law. °1 Simply victimizing a multistate retailer may have an
impact on interstate commerce.2 0 2
III. THE PRACTICALITY OF APPLYING RICO
TO ORGANIZED RETAIL CRIMINALS
Retail theft and fraud are not the "sexiest" crimes and gen-
erally receive lower priorities from law enforcement and prose-
cutors than violent crimes.2 2 However, as technological ad-
vances have made retail crime easier to commit and reduced
the chances of detection,2 4 organized rings have begun to per-
petrate these crimes more frequently. Because RICO has
proven to be a powerful and effective weapon in counteracting
organized crime,20' the potential for its equal effectiveness on
organized retail criminals needs to be evaluated.
It is important to recognize why RICO has yet to be used
against organized retail crime. Two primary reasons exist.
First, because of RICO's incredible strength and flexibility as a
tool for combating crime, the Justice Department has been ex-
tremely hesitant to expand its use of RICO for fear that legisla-
tors or courts will curtail the powers of RICO. 20 ' Recent state-
199. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
203. See Nelson, supra note 27 (stating that retail crime is not the "sexiest
crime in the world" and that law enforcement rightfully concentrates on vio-
lent crime and crimes with individual victims).
204. See NAT'L WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR., supra note 30, at 2 (discussing
how advances in computer and printing technology have made forgery an eas-
ier crime to commit).
205. See supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
206. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS (RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 217 (14th ed.
2000) (expressing the fear that the "injudicious use of RICO may reduce its
impact"); Coffey, supra note 63, at 1045 (commenting on the concern that ex-
panded use of RICO could lead to the development of "restrictive RICO case
law"); Dennis, supra note 91, at 652, 658 (noting that heavy criticism of civil
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207
ments from two Supreme Court Justices justify this concern.
Additionally, the Justice Department recognizes federalism
concerns resulting from the use of RICO. 208 However, to date,
the government has withstood criticism and prevented the re-
strictive tightening of RICO by adhering to its strict procedural
guidelines for prosecuting criminal RICO cases.209
Second, because of the requirement of predicate offenses,
different statutes already cover acts committed by organized
retail criminals.2 0 Thus, state crimes encompassing fraud and
theft can form the basis for a criminal indictment.21' Under cer-
tain circumstances, RICO may actually complicate a prosecu-
tion due to its introduction of the "somewhat foreign concepts of
enterprise, racketeering, and pattern."212
Furthermore, assessing the practicality of RICO begs the
question of whether the current practice of prosecuting single
acts of theft and fraud is sufficient. Organized retail crime
rings could easily be prosecuted for their predicate acts alone.21'
However, prosecuting only the predicate acts would prove in-
RICO may tarnish criminal RICO and lead Congress to needlessly restrict the
criminal RICO provisions).
207. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 254 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the Supreme Court ineffectively addressed
constitutional issues that will arise in the future); Rehnquist, supra note 102
(expressing concern that RICO cases are clogging the federal docket).
208. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ArrORNEYS' MANUAL, § 9-
110.200 (1999) (stating that the "[ultilization of the RICO statute... requires
particularly careful and reasoned application, because, among other things,
RICO incorporates certain state crimes"). While federalism concerns are be-
yond the scope of this Note, it is important to note that RICO, with its incorpo-
ration of state crimes, presents federalism concerns. See generally, e.g., Mi-
chael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case
Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893 (2000) (arguing
that prosecutorial guidelines and discretion control federalization). But see G.
Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Ef-
forts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God-
Is This the End of RICO?", 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 920-24 (1990) (arguing that
RICO neither frustrates nor is inconsistent with the principles of federalism).
209. See Dennis, supra note 91, at 654-55 (arguing that the Justice De-
partment's guidelines for RICO have not led to many failed RICO prosecu-
tions); see also H.R. REP. No. 102-312, at 5 (1991) (finding that the Justice
Department has been "restrained and responsible in its use" of RICO).
210. See Coffey, supra note 63, at 1045; see also MANUAL FOR FEDERAL
PROSECUTORS, supra note 206, at 217 (acknowledging that RICO does not
criminalize any actions that were not already crimes).
211. See Coffey, supra note 63, at 1045.
212. Id.
213. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
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adequate for most of these groups, as it would not permit
prosecution of the ringleaders.214 For example, on the federal
level, individual members could be prosecuted each time they
use a counterfeit identification document to assist their fraudu-
lent purchase.21 They could also be prosecuted for transporting
fraudulently obtained merchandise across state lines.216 These
prosecutions, however, would fail to implicate individuals in
charge of either creating the fraudulent instruments or procur-
ing the information used to create those instruments. They also
fail to implicate the individuals responsible for the organization
of those efforts, who are often the people profiting the most
from the illegal activity.21 Members of organized theft rings
could also be prosecuted for transporting stolen merchandise
across state lines,218 but this would fail to implicate the thieves
who originally stole that merchandise, the people in charge of
organizing both its theft and transportation, and the individu-
als that repackage and distribute the merchandise. Overall,
prosecution based on these predicate acts alone would only end
the activity of a few unimportant, easily replaced members of
the group. It could not connect integral leadership members of
the organization who seldom participate directly in the actual
commission of the predicate offense. 2 9 Donnie Ellis, mentioned
at the outset of this Note, provides the perfect example of how a
ringleader, and the ring itself, can survive efforts directed at its
individual criminal acts, but crumble when law enforcement fo-
cuses on the entire ring.
RICO proved effective against traditional organized crimi-
nals because it allowed law enforcement and prosecutors to fo-
cus on the economic motivation of the groups and to attack
them by eliminating the organizational structure responsible
for deriving and enhancing profitability.22 In a similar fashion,
the government can attack an organized retail crime ring's
profitability and work to eliminate its supporting structure. In
the context of traditional organized crime, the government's
initial efforts to prosecute mob families on a crime-by-crime ba-
214. See supra notes 63, 94 and accompanying text (discussing the insula-
tion of ringleaders from a group's criminal activity).
215. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
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sis were futile, as the history behind RICO and it subsequent
success shows." 1 Simply prosecuting individual retail criminals
for their single acts of forgery, counterfeiting, and theft will
prove as inadequate in eliminating the impact of organized re-
tail crime rings as it did with traditional organized crime.
While efforts to block the acquisition of profits-i.e., imple-
menting stricter legislative controls over the handling of per-
sonal identification by financial institutions as a means of de-
terring criminal activity-may alleviate the problem of
financial fraud and organized theft, these efforts do not elimi-
nate the ring itself. Certainly the innovation and intelligence of
such rings will allow them to find new ways to generate ille-
gitimate profits. Therefore, prosecution of the entire group
through RICO is a viable method that will eliminate the group
and its profit-generating ability, rather than simply deter its
practices.
Another advantage of RICO is that it permits the forfeiture
of criminally obtained money, property, and any existing on-
going interests of the enterprise.223 Though a discussion of
RICO's forfeiture provision is beyond the scope of this Note, for-
feiture is another tool that can quickly remove the profit incen-
224tive of organized criminal rings. While several organized re-
tail crime rings may not have substantial profits to seize, it is
important to retain the forfeiture provision of RICO as a poten-
tial tool, as the full scope of its effectiveness remains to be seen
in the retail crime context. Forfeiture appears to be a plausible
weapon to counter organized theft rings that have established
packaging and distributing enterprises. Similarly, in cases
where a fraud ring uses its profits for personal consumption
aside from drug use, forfeiture can be used to seize items pur-
chased with illegally obtained funds. This can also be used as a
source of restitution to the retail victims of such crimes.
RICO further provides a means for the centralization of of-
ten complex and multijurisdictional crimes. 25 A unified focus is
221. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d 1386, 1393 (2d Cir. 1989) (en
banc) (noting that organized criminals are "sufficiently resourceful and enter-
prising that one constantly is surprised by the variety of offenses that they
commit").
223. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000) (detailing RICO's forfeiture provision).
224. See Attack on La Cosa Nostra, supra note 64, at 11 (discussing the
seizure of assets and cash from Mafia organizations).
225. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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required to effectively combat retail crime. 26 RICO can central-
ize investigations and prosecution of these rings in entities ca-
pable of handling them.227 For example, state entities only have
resources and authority to counter enterprise activity within
their borders. However, the United States Attorney's Office and
FBI have expansive jurisdiction. While criticism of the federali-
228
zation of state crimes exists, it is important to recognize that
RICO attaches only to crimes that have already been federal-
ized ,229 as indicated by the predicate acts specified in the stat-
ute. Additionally, RICO federalizes the enterprising aspect of
organized crime rings.230 RICO can be used as a weapon to pro-
mote the efficient and complete investigation and prosecution
of organized crime rings.
CONCLUSION
Historically, RICO has proven its worth. Enacted as a
means of eliminating the strength of the mob, RICO enabled
the government to strike at organized criminal activity. While
the creators of RICO may have envisioned removing traditional
mob influence as RICO's sole purpose, they had the foresight to
develop a powerful and versatile weapon capable of combating
all forms of organized criminal activity. The broad and liberal
construction of RICO, as mandated by statute, proves that an
extension of RICO into the realm of organized retail crime is
within the intent of its drafters. RICO is a viable weapon to
counteract the tremendous growth of organized theft and fraud
rings, as apparent by the staggering economic losses attribut-
able to these groups.
Unfortunately, RICO alone cannot eliminate these groups.
Instead, as was the case with traditional forms of organized
crime, other components must be involved. The efforts of inves-
tigative units such as the FBI and prosecutorial agencies such
as the United States Attorney's Office must focus upon organ-
226. See Attack on La Cosa Nostra, supra note 64, at 17-19 (stressing the
importance of careful planning, the partnership between law enforcement and
the Department of Justice, and public attention in counteracting organized
crime).
227. See Blakey & Perry, supra note 208, at 909-12 (arguing that states
cannot adequately counter "sophisticated forms of fraud").
228. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing federalism con-
cerns).
229. See Blakey & Perry, supra note 208, at 920-24 (arguing that RICO is
intended to implement federalism).
230. Id.
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ized retail crime. The assistance of individual retailers is also
required. However, without the use of RICO to strike at the
criminal enterprise, focused and joint investigative efforts will
only result in solidifying single criminal charges based on the
predicate act. Even though the government will be able to pur-
sue an airtight criminal charge of counterfeiting, for example,
the structure of the ring will remain intact. RICO provides a
stepping stone to contain and ultimately eliminate the prob-
lems associated with organized retail crime.

